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In this essay I want to suggest that a nomadic poetics, as opposed to one associated with  Martin  Heidegger’s  concept  of  ‘dwelling’,  might  urge  writers  and  readers reconfigure  some  of  their  relationships  to  Australian  environments.  ‘To  become dwellers  in  the  land,’  says  Kirkpatrick  Sale,  ‘to  come  to  know  the  earth,  fully  and honestly, the crucial and perhaps all‐encompassing task is to understand the place, the immediate, specific place, where we live’.1 The nomadology of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, however, would critique the primacy of any single home or dwelling place  and  instead  acknowledge  the  entire  earth  as  the  ground  for  possible movements.  Following  on  from  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  I  want  to  ask  whether knowing  an  ‘immediate,  specific  place’  is  necessarily  the  most  ecologically sustainable  form  of  habitation,  given  that  ecosystems  flourish  by  virtue  of  their myriad  interconnections with  other  places.  Sale’s  comment  also  presents  political problems  in a  colonised  landscape  like  the Australian one, where an  insistence on the  value  of  a  non‐Indigenous  individual’s  connection  to  his  or  her  dwelling place might  ignore the claims of  traditional custodians.  I am not proposing an enormous 
Stuart Cooke—Echo-Coherence  231 
societal  phase‐shift,  in which we would  become hunting  and  gathering  nomads  of the  twenty‐first  century.  Rather,  I will  argue  that  a  nomadic  poetics  of  Australian places, or a light‐footed travel across them, with an ever‐present readiness to move on  should  certain  situations  demand  our  departure,  can  offer  some  promising alternatives  for the ways  in which we relate to, write about and manage contested and climactically variable locales.   ‘The  life  of  the  nomad  is  the  intermezzo’ write  Deleuze  and  Guattari.  The nomad  is  always  moving  from  one  place  to  another  so  that  each  of  his  or  her dwellings  becomes  part  of  an  entire  trajectory.2  It  is  important  that  a  nomadic poetics concerns not only our relationship with the pastoral or with those spaces in which  the vast majority of  citizens  in Western countries no  longer  live. Cities,  too, need  to  embrace  nomadic  thinking.  If  sea  levels  continue  to  rise,  thousands  of inhabitants of Manhattan, for example, will need to leave their homes to search for others, like so many in New Orleans were forced to do after Hurricane Katrina. For the billions of city‐dwellers in Latin America, Asia and Africa, for whom migration to and between cities in search of work is a basic fact of existence, life is already spent in  the  realm of  the  interstitial. Across a  time span of, perhaps, one hundred years, the homes of these people will  indeed constitute trajectories across large stretches of  terrain.  As  a way  of writing  and  describing  such  a  condition,  nomadic  thinking translates to a poetics that is also more light‐footed, which resists the temptation to erect  concrete  definitions  and  demarcations,  and  nimbly  responds  to  whatever fluctuations might occur along the way. Regular  dictionary  definitions  of  ‘dwelling’  and  ‘dwell’  provide  useful introductions  to  Heidegger’s  conception  of  the  term.  A  ‘dwelling’  is  ‘a  building  or place  of  shelter  to  live  in’,  while  the  verb  ‘dwell’  means  ‘to  live  or  stay  as  a permanent  resident’  or  to  ‘reside’.  It  also  means  ‘to  live  or  continue  in  a  given condition  or  state’  or  ‘to  linger  over,  emphasize,  or  ponder  in  thought,  speech,  or writing’.3 For Heidegger, these qualities merge into a particular kind of sensitivity to the more‐than‐purely‐human needs of the earth. To be attuned to the earth is to live in a way quite alien to the lifestyles of many contemporary Western people; it is to respect the difference, or what Heidegger calls the self­concealing, of entities, rather than  attempting  to  coerce  all matter  into  forms  useful  for  human  beings.  It  is  the task of the poem to bring to light the self‐concealing natures of things. By dwelling 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poetically,  therefore, we are, with  the help of poetry,  to become more sensitive  to, and careful of, the presence of the world’s things. Ich bin—or, ‘I am’—is equivalent, writes Heidegger, to ich baun, which is, literally, ‘I dwell’. The way in which you are and  I  am,’  he  says,  ‘the  manner  in  which  we  humans  are  on  the  earth,  is  Baun, dwelling.’4 Importantly, however, baun, to dwell, also signifies ‘to remain, to stay in a place’,5  which  should  remind  us  of  the  intransient  relationship  between  the individual  subject  and  the  domain  in  which  he  or  she  dwells.  This  is  further highlighted  by  Heidegger’s  linkage  of  dwelling  to  the  Gothic  concept  of  wunian, which refers to peace—whether to be brought to it or to remain in it. Dwelling, then, involves a peaceful remaining—a form of quiet stasis, in other words. For Heidegger, to be at peace means to be free, and to be really free means to spare. Sparing ‘takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own nature, when  we  return  it  specifically  to  its  own  being’.  A  fundamental  characteristic  of dwelling is this ‘sparing and preserving’ of things.6 Furthermore, dwelling is the end to  which  building  is  a  means.  It  is  by  virtue  of  such  building  practices,  which demarcate  with  the  mineral  resources  of  the  land  the  place  of  our  continued presence upon  it,  that we establish ourselves as dwellers.   Yet  ‘building’ refers not only to the erection of edifices but also to the building, or cultivation, of agriculture. Thus, baun also refers to a cherishing and protecting, and preserving and caring for, the earth—which, for Heidegger, means ‘to till the soil, to cultivate the vine’.7 Poetry is  so  important  in  this  context  because  in  its  language  Heidegger  sees  a  house  of being.  It  is  through poetic  language  that  unconcealment  takes  place;  by  disclosing the self‐concealing of entities in language, therefore, the poet lets them be within the poem’s protective enclosure. In this way, poetry constructs dwelling places, because of which  Heidegger  assigns  a  special,  sacred  role  to  the  poet.  The  composition  of poetry  is  a  joyous  activity,  for  which  the  Serene  appears  to  the  poet.  The  Serene ‘keeps  everything  in  a  state  of  homeliness’  and  ‘allots  each  thing  to  that  place  of existence where by its nature it belongs, so that it may stand there in the brightness of the Serene, like a still light’.8 It  is not  that  things remain static within  the Serene;  it  is,  rather,  that  these things  remain  where  they  belong.  The  domicile,  in  other  words,  becomes  an enclosure;  home  becomes  property.  When  poems  act  as  dwelling  places  for  the Serene,  curious  things  happen  to  their  poetics,  and  to  our  readings  of  them.  In  a 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reading directly inspired by Heidegger’s later essays on poetry, Jonathan Bate notes, for example, that the things of the world in Les Murray’s poetry are, as in the Serene, ‘robustly  active’.9 What he does not  analyse  is  the  complicated,  colonial  politics  of positing Murray as ‘an aboriginal kind of creator or recreator’, or, in other words, as the builder of  a home.10 We  can  look more  closely  at  the matter by  turning  to  the poet  himself.  In  ‘Evening  Alone  at  Bunyah’11  Murray  has  returned  to  his  country home  to  escape  from  the  chaos  of  the  urban world.  The  narrative,  then,  is  of  the return  to  a  particular  place  to  which  in  some  sense  Murray’s  speaker  feels  he inevitably  belongs.  Having  returned,  the  speaker  is  able  to  see,  quite  clearly, everything  before  him.  This  act  of  seeing  grants  him  something  of  a  right  of ownership,  but  the  seeing  can  only  take  place  after  a  very  powerful  mode  of dwelling  has  been  established—one  that  is  both  peaceful  and  positioned  from  a particular,  heightened  vantage  point.  The  speaker  is  at  home  alone  on  his  farm, where  he  belongs,  on  a  cool  and  apparently  serene  night,  with  the  valley  relaxing after the heat of the day.  To establish a dwelling,  first a foundation must be constructed. In Murray’s poem,  the  foundation consists of bricks of memory.  ‘Home again  from the cities of the world’,  he  establishes  his  connection  to  the  locale  by  describing  a  long  list  of memories associated with the farm, before proceeding to outline in stunning detail some of the its features. Such a tremendous accretion of information seems to lock the place, quite firmly, in its place. The crucial move in ‘Bunyah’ is what Bate would call  a  quietening  of  the  eye,  or  a  reduction  in  emphasis  on  the  speaker’s  act  of perception.12  Yet  the  speaker’s  presence  is  not  in  any  way  diminished  as  a consequence;  instead,  his  being  firmly  anchored  to  the  dwelling  place,  now  the speaker  can  flow out  into  the  surrounding  location.  The  subject’s mind—in which memories  are  housed—and  vision—with  which  features  are  perceived—achieve unquestionable  primacy.  Murray  connects  his  consciousness  to  the  ecosystem  in order to proclaim: This country is my mind. I lift my face and count my hills, and linger over each one: Deer’s, steep, bare‐topped, where eagles nest below the summit in scrub oaks, and where I take my city friends to tempt them with my past. 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... I think of doors and rooms beneath the ground, deep rabbit rooms, thin candlelight of days… In  the  context  of  the  movement  of  a  poem,  coming  home  ‘from  the  cities  of  the world’ is like zooming in, from the chaos of the macrosphere, to the clearer outlines of the microsphere. It is this place, exactly here, which Murray isolates and claims as his own. Perhaps because of their own social and ecological contexts, European eco‐critics  like Bate rarely deal with  the deeper  implications of Heideggerian dwelling. By insisting on the stasis of one’s home while all else around one’s home is involved in  processes  of  constant  change,  we  are  grounding  ourselves  in  the  linguistic confines  of  one  particular  European  community: we  are  reaching  back  to  the  Old High German of Bauen, we are staying in place.13  In this way, we are  insisting on a phenomenological relationship with the earth that is decidedly Eurocentric: we are saying that our right as human beings to feel at home, to feel ‘close’ to the earth and to build homes upon it,  is  the absolute right. The right of  the earth to breathe, and the rights of other people to resist the geodetic confines of property lines, are all to be considered after the fact. Les Murray is not the only Australian writer who needs to be critically re‐evaluated in this light, either.  In  Reinhabiting  Reality,  Freya  Mathews  forgoes  her  usually  thorough ecological  philosophy  to  indulge  in  similarly  Eurocentric  notions  of  ‘home’  and ‘belonging’.  In  her  chapter  on  ‘Becoming  Native’  she  describes,  in  rigorous  detail, how ‘engaging with the given’ will enable us to find more meaning in, and therefore come closer to, each of those various environments—urban or not—in which human beings  live.  In her  argument  for  a  re‐engagement with all  those  components—old, new,  alive  and  dead—that  combine  to  form  our  experience  of  place,  we  find  a further revision of Heideggerian dwelling. According to Mathews, you are to ‘find a residence  that  you  can occupy  indefinitely’  and  ‘[b]e devoted  to your house.  Let  it know  that  it  is  yours  for  life,  til  death  do  you  part’.14  This  involves  a  process  of itemisation  that  is  strikingly  similar  to  that  in which Murray engages  in his poem, and  results  in  a  similar  state  of  subjective primacy. Having  succeeded  in  engaging with the givenness of those things—human and non‐human, alive and inanimate—that occupy your house, you might then take note of some ‘further considerations’. Here Mathews admits that as: 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a  white  Australian,  it  is  more  than  evident  to  me  that  I  cannot  become native  to,  and  custodian  for,  my  homeplace  …  until  my  nonindigenous countrymen and women acknowledge the truth of our history here, since this is a major part of the truth of our land. To become ‘fully native’ thus requires, she says, that Australian settlers acknowledge the  whole  colonial  history  of  the  nation,  ‘opening  ourselves  to  all  the  regret  and preparedness  to  compensate  that  such  acknowledgement  entrains’.  It  is  also important,  furthermore,  to  remember  that  we  cannot  ‘assume  the  role  of  come‐lately  natives  and  custodians  unless  and  until  the  original  natives  and  custodians accept  our presence here,  and  invite  us  to  join  them’.  These  are  important points, and Mathews is to be acclaimed for stating that no such invitation can be made until ‘we  declare  the  wrong  we  have  done’  to  Aboriginal  people.15  However,  if  we  are already installed in these residences that we have decided to occupy until death, to which we now,  it  seems,  inevitably  belong,  how might we  approach  a  situation  in which  the  Aboriginal  owners,  whose  lands  we  have  taken  to  establish  our residences, do not issue us this most important of invitations? How can we be really, genuinely  open  to  what  Mathews  terms  the  givenness  of  reality,  and  to  the ‘preparedness  to  compensate’,  if  we  are  then  unable  to move  off  those  lands  that Aboriginal people want vacated? Why, the question becomes, do we want to become ‘fully native’ at all? Of  course,  such  a  question  returns  us  to  Heidegger’s  oft‐discussed problematic  relationship  to German Nationalist movements of  the nineteen‐forties and  fifties.  From  a  basic  ecological  perspective,  however,  practical  expressions  of Heideggerian  dwelling  raise  further,  less‐understood  problems.  Sparing  and building  in the  light of  the Serene fails  to acknowledge the ways  in which Western agricultural practices have evolved by manipulating wild plants for human ends and, in  Louise  Westling’s  words,  by  ‘the  tilling  of  the  soil  which  disrupts  the  normal diversity of microorganisms and patterns of water  retention and plant diversity’.16 Indeed, the relationship between dwelling and agricultural practice is only the most literal manifestation of what can constitute a vast matrix of poetic and philosophical understandings  about  landscape.  Examples  like  those  from  Murray  and  Mathews show  how  even  larger  ecological  cycles—composed  of  both  mental  and  earthly terrains—can  be  manipulated  to  construct  a  solitary  individual’s  dwelling  place, 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thereby  emphasising  the  self‐reflexive  capacities  of  the  subject  above  all  other transformations and processes.  Indeed, many have questioned the utility of continuing with epistemologies based on the concept of the discrete subject—phenomenology, for example—when our combined mass  is causing  the planet such harm.17 As Michel Serres points out, humans do not  just dwell  as  individuals, but  they weigh on  the earth  in combined fashion.18  For  Serres,  the  immediate,  pressing  issues  resulting  from  a  combined population mass have overridden the importance of local and individual conceptions of the human. Thinking about  ‘the individual human’ is complicated ecologically by the consequences of sheer physical quantity: while we might still think of ourselves as  individual  beings,  and may  even  attempt  to  dwell  in  Heideggerian  fashion,  our primary communities—our cities—are not aware of their own Being and therefore are unable to dwell.19 Throughout human history, an increase in human population density  has  invariably  coincided  with  a  decrease  in  the  biodiversity  of  the surrounding  ecosystems,  with  animals  and  plants  forced  out  of  urban  areas  or replaced  by  planted  monocultures.20  Global  networks  of  cities  invite  us  to contemplate  a  vast  array  of  scenarios  in  which  dwelling  is  extremely  rare,  both because  the  individual  doesn’t  and  the  city  can’t.  When  the  Heideggerian  subject dwells  he  or  she  is  concerned  about  being  responsive  to  the  events  in  his  or  her locale, but ich baun does not account for the earth’s response to the aggregate effects of six billion humans feeding from intensive agricultural production. This leads us to a posthumously published paper by the late Val Plumwood about what she calls ‘shadow places’ and the politics of dwelling. For Plumwood, the very concept of a singular homeplace or origin is problematised by the dissociation and  dematerialisation  that  permeate  the  global  economy  and,  consequently, Western  culture.  This  culture,  she  writes,  ‘creates  a  split  between  the  singular, elevated,  conscious  “dwelling”  place,  and  the  multiple  disregarded  places  of economic  and  ecological  support’.  Dwelling  compounds  this  situation  ‘by encouraging  us  to  direct  our  honouring  of  place  towards  an  “official”  singular idealised  place  consciously  identified  with  self,  while  disregarding  the  many unrecognised, shadow places that provide our material and ecological support, most of which,  in a global market, are  likely  to elude our knowledge and responsibility’. Plumwood concludes that this is not an ecological form of consciousness. Positions 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which are ostensibly place‐based, like bioregionalism, evade rather than resolve this problem  of  the  split  by  focusing  on  singular,  self‐sufficient  communities,  thus ‘substituting  a  simplistic  ideal  of  atomic  places  for  recognition  of  the  multiple, complex network of places  that supports our daily  lives’. Communities,  she writes, should  always  be  imagined  in  relation  to  one  another.  A  proper  ecological consciousness  has  to  look  at  both  the  attractive  places  and  those  shadow  places which  are  otherwise  neglected.  In  her  typically  fiery  vernacular,  Plumwood demands  that  such  thought  ‘has  to  be much more  than  a  literary  rhapsody  about nice places, or about nice times (epiphanies) in nice places’.21 Plumwood’s analysis is so important because it asks that we reconsider the power  relations  inherent  in  all  place‐based  talk.  For  example,  how  is  one  place deemed to be better than another? How do global processes make one place better than  another?  Why,  then,  are  some  places  cherished  more  than  others?  For Plumwood, the influence of Heidegger is sending ecological discussions in the wrong direction, for he places an excessive focus on a single, detached dwelling place that obscures the global connectedness of ecological issues. The Heideggerian singularity of  focus also supports a concept of the home as property of the self, all of which is set apart  from and above other places,  in  terms of  care and priority. Centric place ideals of military empire and colonial privilege, best expressed for Plumwood in the image  of  the  moated  castle,  rest  on  the  subordination  and  instrumentalisation  of other  places.  This  One  True  Dwelling  Place  can  easily  become  a  national‐cultural home,  a  special  place  elevated  above  all  others,  whose  purification  demands  the eviction  of  alien  elements.  Clearly,  such  a  discourse  can  legitimate  projects  of perfecting  and  purifying  the  home  at  the  expense  of  other,  lesser  homes—homes, perhaps,  of  ‘less  civilised’  indigenous  others  who  do  not  ‘dwell’  in  acceptable fashions, ‘whose ties to the land do not take the form of cultivated labour, and whose places can be deemed degradable under the guise of improving civilisation’.22 What Plumwood is arriving at here is a form of thinking that eats at this locus of place‐ and subject‐centred power, and shifts constantly between various places in recognition of the manner in which they are all networked. More than on any other continent, to dwell or to remain in place in Australia is  generally  not  conducive  to  promoting  the  flourishing  of  any  kind  of  life. Thousands of houses on the edges of our major coastal centres face serious threats 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from  rising  sea  levels,  and  little  can  be  done  to  ensure  that  their  inhabitants  can keep their properties. The sustained use of intensive agriculture throughout much of inland  New  South Wales  and  south Western  Australia  has  left  vast  tracts  of  land destroyed by high levels of salinity. With the exception of some rich, fertile patches of volcanic soil along the country’s east coast, the lack of glacial or volcanic activity in the rest of  the continent means, according to Tim Flannery (over a decade ago), that ‘Australia has by far the poorest soil of any continent. Virtually all of our soils … were made  long ago  [and] are now being  rapidly used up and cannot be  replaced. Many  of  them  are  skeletal  and  extremely  badly  leached’.  ‘Australian  soils  contain approximately half the level of nitrates and phosphates … to equivalent soils found anywhere else’.23 Yet this is not to say that the quality of the land was always so poor. On the contrary,  sophisticated,  precolonial  land  practices  had  cultivated  an  enormous storage  of  potential  energy.  Eric  Rolls  writes  that  before  European  invasion,  the continent’s soil: had a mulch of thousands of years. The surface was so loose you could rake it through the fingers. No wheel had marked it, no leather heel, no cloven hoof—every  mammal,  humans  included,  had  walked  on  padded  feet. Digging  sticks  had  prodded  it,  but  no  steel  shovel  had  ever  turned  a  full sod. Our big animals did not make trails.24  Instead  of  engaging  in  a  concentrated  dwelling  (and  tilling  and  shovelling  and grazing),  the  first  Australian  inhabitants—human  and  non‐human  alike—were decidedly more ambulatory, travelling more frequently across far larger habitats: Hopping kangaroos usually move  in  scattered  company, not  in damaging single  file  like  sheep  and  cattle.  The  plentiful  wombats  each maintained several  burrows,  so  there  were  no  well‐used  runs  radiating  from  one centre  as  from  a  rabbit  warren  …  No  other  land  had  been  treated  so gently.25  As Plumwood, Flannery and Rolls  show us,  the practical manifestation of a Heideggerian poetics of dwelling, of steadfastly and resolutely forming deep roots in whatever  is  in  one’s  immediate  vicinity,  is  clearly  at  odds  with  the  exploitation, fragility  and  uncertainty  of  Australian  climates—an  uncertainty  which  is  rapidly becoming the global norm. 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We might find no better summation of the way in which Australian land use was radically altered after colonisation, and the way in which this change is linked to a starkly different mode of habitation, than in the history of the nation’s capital city, Canberra.26 The region’s grassy plains and forested hills, which were so attractive to early pastoralists, were the handiwork of several Aboriginal tribes; what colonisers’ saw  as  amenable  pastoral  country  was  in  no  sense  a  ‘wild’  one,  but  the  result  of Indigenous  agricultural  methods.  The  colonial  settlement  of  Kamberri  and  the subsequent  development  of  Canberra  was  a  permanent  settling  and,  later, urbanisation  of  places  that  had  been  cherished  by Aboriginal  people  as  points  for meetings  and  ceremonial  gatherings.  This  is  to  say  it  was  on  grounds  that  for millennia  had  witnessed  an  endless  proliferation  of  arrivals  and  departures,  of temporary  gatherings,  of  human  voices  and  silences,  that  the  invaders  simply settled. Symbolically, if nothing else, there is an insistence on the stasis of dwelling at the heart of the administrative and political capital of the Australian nation. There  have  been  many  critical  responses  in  Australian  letters  to  this problem, which have often resulted in arguments for more nomadic modes of being and  thinking.  George  Seddon  finds  in  the  innovative  farming  practices  of  Sidney Kidman (1857–1935) the beginnings of a new kind of colonial relationship with the Australian terrain. Though highly critical of Kidman’s  long, damaging files of sheep and  cattle,  Seddon  makes  an  example  of  Kidman’s  nomadic  land  management practices. Unlike stock management in the manner of a rabbit warren, where stock are confined within a small area and limited to movement within that area, Kidman was  able  to move his  animals  across huge distances  to  take  advantage of  the best feeds, while allowing other areas  to rest and recover. With access  to so much  land (130,000  square  miles  at  the  time  of  his  death—far  larger  than  any  government sponsored sub‐division) he had both the means and the acumen to move his stock in a nomadic fashion. While his knowledge of nomadism was certainly lacking, and the ownership of  so much property certainly problematic, he nevertheless understood that  country  was  meant  to  be  left,  and  then  to  be  returned  to  once  allowed  to recover. Perhaps, proposes Seddon, we all should have followed in Kidman’s steps, reserving the arid and subarid parts of the continent for nomadic use, allowing our herds  of  hoofed  animals  to  roam  over  the  landscape  according  to  the  seasons. 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Instead ‘we imposed leasehold boundaries that critically limited mobility and often locked the leaseholder into a cycle of destruction’.27 The challenge to go yet further—to take the nomadic movement of bodies in space and translate it  into a kind of poetics—is taken up by Pierre Joris. Central to his  ‘nomad poetics’  is  the  form of  the rhizome, which  is derived  from Deleuze and Guattari. Poetry in the form of a rhizome is not a collage, or a collection of disparate fragments,  but  it  charts  a  journey  through  ‘a  material  flux  of  language matter’.  It begins with ‘a temporary articulation, essentially mobile, constituted of movements and their ephemeral stases’,  then follows  ‘this  flux of ruptures and articulations, of rhythm, moving  in  &  out  of  semantic  and  non‐semantic  spaces, moving  around & through  the  features  accreting  as  poem’.28  It  resists,  therefore,  the  desire  to  stop. Short breaks are taken, but the world remains in a constant flux. In his latest book, 
blue grass, Peter Minter produced one of  the most  striking examples of  a nomadic poetics in Australian poetry. The following is an extract from ‘is it is’:29  The earth prolongs mutation,   rumbles for our listening to plants as if it is just animal, humus, bone   whistle that we speak with, or just love   & die then usurped for dwelling here. I will listen to you & the world’s prolific nose, refuse indifference   as the winds’ press & topic  proliferates indifferently,   costs parables of fallen trunks.   Cumuli hoist and the sky leans fast, traces over countries Loded deep with marrow, crescent spines   & ruins made fecund.  I’ll follow too, as we free and offer   blue cosmos caught on winter’s stakes    walk way along the sky’s arc, echo & cohere. 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There is much—too much—to discuss with relation to a poem like this one, but what we might note immediately is the dramatic confluence of a wide variety of ‘language matter’:  forms  of  perception,  evocations  of  sounds,  smells  and  sights.  The  act  of sampling or recycling, important throughout the entire book, is present here: in the manner of a rhizome spreading out through the soil, blue grass draws on numerous other  poetic  ecologies  for  energy.  Important,  too,  is  the manner  in which  none  of these perceptive modes or ‘matters’ is given particular primacy: there is no peaceful correlation of sense into a single,  ‘correct’ vision. The poem itself is also exemplary of  the ways  in which poetry, should  it be willing to cross traditional boundaries of grammar, can acknowledge the historical genealogy of place without dwelling upon it. Here, fragments collide and coalesce in order to speak as palimpsest; the land is nothing if not steeped in historical layers. Then there is the crucial issue of locale, in which  the  above  points  are  implicated.  The  heavy  textures  of  the  language,  its mineral‐like  density,  firmly  anchor  the  poem  to  the  earth  yet  there  remains  a question of where, exactly, we are upon this earth. The collective relationships implied by the discussion of listening, following, and echoing are part of what is most certainly a nomadic poetic: we move together, and there is no final destination. Each image in ‘is it is’ is glimpsed as part of a larger process  of  communal  song.  Indeed,  as  the  book’s  title  suggests,  this  poem  is most certainly musical. As in any song, the voices are important in blue grass, for they are not  housed  in  domiciles  but  are,  on  the  contrary,  interacting  closely  with myriad materials,  all  widely  dispersed;  we  walk  ‘along  the  sky’s  arc’  with  a  deceptively simple  thought  that  has  the  potential  to  provoke  infinite  bifurcations:  echo  and 
cohere.  The  voice  returning  from  its  interaction  with  the  rock  face—some  of  it dissolved  in  the  journey;  some  of  it  returning  as  the  ‘‐co’—is  part  of  a  dialogical process in which co + here form a coherence. Locality, in other words, is defined by the velocities of energies which travel between it and the other‐localities to which it is connected. This is echological. We are not rooted in a location, relentlessly sucking up  groundwater;  we  are,  rather,  speakers  of  anonymous  matter,  always communicating  the  transformation  of  energies  across  multiple  subjectivities.  For Deleuze and Guattari, meaning is only  the product of ongoing expression; meaning, therefore,  is  attunement  to  this  process  of  translation  and  transformation.30  An 
echological  poetic  is  not  ‘an  attempt  to  transform  into  language  an  experience  of 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dwelling upon the earth’, as Bate says of the ecopoem, but it is a transformation into 
language.31 We can get a more rigorous sense of the kind of poetics involved in ‘is it is’, and  made  manifest  by  Sidney  Kidman,  by  looking  at  the  concept  of  mētis,  as elaborated  in  by  James  C.  Scott.  Scott  observes  that  thin,  formulaic  simplifications imposed  through  the  agency  of  state  power,  such  as  the  leasehold  boundaries critiqued by Seddon, invariably lead to both natural and social failures. On the other hand,  ‘mētis represents a wide array of practical skills and acquired  intelligence  in responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment’.32 Just as ‘is it is’  samples  other  elements  in  order  to  construct  a  form,  the  practitioner  of mētis ‘will  typically  represent  a  recombination  (bricolage,  to  use  Lévi‐Strauss’s  term)  of existing  elements’.33  The  utilisation  of  practical,  earthly  elements  will  produce  a variety  of  complex,  adaptive  techniques  for  dealing  with  the  problems  in  the environment  at  hand.  Mētis  is  invariably  communal,  too,  because  it  consists  of  a body  of  constantly  evolving  knowledge  that  no  one  individual  could  ever  amass alone.34  Again,  like  ‘is  it  is’,  this  accumulative  process  of  knowledge  acquisition  is never intended to reach a final destination of truth or complete realisation; mētis is anything  but  static,  and will  continue  developing  long  after  any  individual  subject has passed away.  The practice and experience reflected in mētis is almost always local, but it never  insists  on  a particular  idea  of  the  local.  The knowledge  is  always  expanding through practical experimentation.35 This  is  indeed the case with the vast majority of Indigenous knowledges, which rely ‘on an accumulation of many partly redundant signals’,36  and  are  known  for  their  striking  ability  to  incorporate  new  flora,  fauna and technologies into an already large and complex world‐view. The ability of mētis to  resist  confinement  to  any  one  place  or  time  is  a  function  of  its  diversity;  its resilience is directly related to the material diversity present in the world in which it develops.  This  is  also  the  case  in  natural  systems,  where  a  decrease  in  diversity renders  them  ‘more  vulnerable  and  nonsustainable’,  and  in  human  institutions, where Scott  contrasts  ‘the  fragility of  rigid,  single purpose,  centralized  institutions to  the  adaptability  of  more  flexible,  multipurpose,  decentralized  social  forms’.  As long as the task environment remains stable, predictable and energy‐rich, dwelling upon it within a fixed boundary may prove extremely efficient.  In most economies, 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in human affairs,  and  in  a  rapidly warming global  climate,  this  is  seldom  the  case, and ‘such routines are likely to be counterproductive once the environment changes appreciably’.37 A  fundamental  component  of  Heideggerian  dwelling  is  the  saving  of  the earth. To  save  the  earth  ‘is more  than  to  exploit  it  or  even wear  it  out.  Saving  the earth  does  not master  the  earth  and  does  not  subjugate  it’.38  Dwelling,  therefore, requires us to save the earth; to dwell means to take care of the soil; to take care of the soil means to till the soil. We cannot till the soil, however, because tilling would spoil  the  soil  and  thereby  spoil  the  earth.  How  do  we  deal  with  such  circular reasoning? Assuming that we cannot, is such a complicated and contradictory term as  ‘dwelling’  still  useful? A  critique  such  as  the  one  provided  by  Plumwood might lead  us  to  consider  a  kind  of  nomadic  ontology  based  on  the  concept  of mētis,  in which concrete categories and property lines are dissolved into an understanding of how  energy  and  knowledge  flows  between  places.  For  Deleuze,  this  is  what  all thought  should do.  ‘Heidegger was mistaken about people, earth, blood’, he wrote, since  those  who  think  are  in  fact  never  ‘landed’  anywhere.39  Rigorous,  critical thinking  never  arrives  at  a  conclusion;  it  slips  between  gaps  and  produces  new trajectories  for  further  consideration.  As  a  poetics,  therefore,  the  nomadic  writer need  no  longer  insist  that  inert  meanings  are  waiting  to  be  found  residing, ultimately,  within  the  walls  of  language;  rather,  the  transformation  from  non‐linguistic matter  to  linguistic matter becomes of primary  importance  in his  or her search  for  a  closer,  more  sensitive  relationship  between  words  and  the  ever‐changing terrain of which they speak. ‘The  days  of  anything  static,’  writes  Joris,  ‘are  over.  The  past  century  has shown that anything not involved in continuous transformation hardens and dies.’40 In  the  present  atmosphere  of  a  global  climate  crisis  resulting  from  a  gross  over‐production and consumption of myriad materials, dwelling anywhere for too long is of  course  enormously  problematic. We  need  to  be  thinking  in  ways  that  respond with  speed  and  agility  to  the  rapidly  changing  and  highly  dangerous  situations  in which we as a  species  increasingly  find ourselves. Of  course,  acting with  too much speed  is  equally  problematic,  but  it  is  another  issue  that  needs  revisiting.  In  this global context, however, Australian responses to instability, to drought, to floods, to a  basically  grumpy  and  unsympathetic  environment  become  ever  more  relevant. 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Australian Aboriginal cultures are the only ones in the world to have survived from the Ice Age to the present day, and they have done so on the world’s most variable of continents. To  survive more  than a  few hundred years, Heideggerian dwelling has 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